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The Dynamics of Social Assistance Benefit Receipt in Britain
* 
 
We analyze the dynamics of social assistance benefit (SA) receipt among working-age adults 
in Britain between 1991 and 2005. The decline in the annual SA receipt rate was driven by a 
decline in the SA entry rate, rather than by the SA exit rate (which actually declined too). We 
examine the determinants of these trends using a multivariate dynamic random effects probit 
model of SA entry and exit probabilities applied to British Household Panel Survey data. The 
model estimates and accompanying counterfactual simulations highlight the importance of 
two factors – the decline in the unemployment rate over the period, and other changes in the 
socioeconomic environment including two reforms to the income maintenance system in the 
1990s. The results also reveal a substantial heterogeneity in SA annual transition rates. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
For at least two decades, “welfare to work” ideas have strongly influenced social policy 
thinking on both sides of the Atlantic and in English-speaking OECD nations more generally. 
There has been substantial interest in reorienting the design of systems of cash transfers for 
poor working-age families away from schemes involving passive receipt of benefits 
(“welfare”) towards schemes in which individuals are more actively involved in meeting 
minimum income requirements, by increasing their labor market participation (“work”). In 
the USA, this reorientation is illustrated by the abolition of the Aid for Families with 
Dependent Children program by the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act and introduction of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
program with time limited benefit payments. The Earned Income Tax Credit program 
supporting low income working families was expanded during the 1980s and 1990s, and is a 
major anti-poverty policy.  
  Britain’s Labour Government, elected in 1997, was strongly influenced by the US 
reforms. It is responsible for substantial extensions to the provision and generosity of in-work 
benefits through the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) program introduced in 1999 and 
modified and extended in 2003. Major social assistance benefit programs for working age 
families remain in place, however, though with some modifications in the mid-1990s that 
tightened eligibility requirements for unemployed people of working age.  
This background raises questions such as: How much did dependence on social 
assistance benefits decline over the last two decades in Britain? To what extent were policy 
reforms responsible for observed trends and what was the role played by other factors such as 
labor market tightness? This paper documents what happened to social assistance benefit 
receipt dynamics in Britain over the period 1991–2005 and explains trends using an 
econometric model fitted to household panel data. 
  To set the scene, look at Figure 1 which shows trends in receipt of social assistance 
benefit (SA) receipt in Britain. (Definitions and data are explained in more detail later.) Apart 
from the rise in receipt at the beginning of the 1990s when Britain went into recession, the 
percentage of working age adults in receipt of SA halved, falling from a peak of around 12 
percent in 1993 to around 6 percent in 2005. If the definition of SA is widened to include 
housing benefits, the proportion in receipt each year is consistently 2–3 percent higher, but 
follows a similar downward trend. Two leading explanations for these trends are the reforms 
to the benefit system intending to “make work pay” and changes in labor market tightness.    Figure 1 shows the substantial increase over the period in receipt of in-work cash 
assistance (‘tax credits’). The proportion of working-age adults in receipt was consistently 
about 2–3 percent during the 1990s, until the introduction of WFTC in October 1999 after 
which the proportion in receipt rose dramatically to almost 7 percent in 2002. The receipt rate 
then rose again significantly with the extension of eligibility in 2003. Observe that the turning 
points in the SA receipt rate series do not correspond closely with the turning points in the 
series for tax credit receipt, suggesting that in-work benefit reforms were not a major driver 
of the former. By contrast, note the relatively close correspondence between the trends in the 
unemployment rate and in the SA receipt rate. These and other explanations are examined in 
greater detail later in the paper. 
<Figure 1 near here> 
  Since changes in SA receipt rate from year to year reflect the combination of changes 
in annual rates of entry to or exit from receipt (which are processes with different 
determinants), we analyze entry and exit rates. Figure 2 shows the trends in these SA 
transition rates over the period 1991–2005. The entry rate fell from above 4 percent in 1993 
to below 2 percent in 2005. The exit rate fell from around 40 percent to nearly 25 percent (the 
greater variability in the rate at the end of the period may simply reflect small sample sizes). 
<Figure 2 near here> 
  We conclude that the secular decline in annual (cross-sectional) SA receipt rates was 
driven primarily by a decline in entry rates: the fall in the entry rate was sufficiently large that 
it offset the decline in the exit rate over the same period (which would increase receipt rates, 
other things being equal). This conclusion follows directly from the stock-flow identity that 
links the proportion receiving SA in year t to entry and exit rates.
1 The importance for trends 
in cross-sectional receipt of changes in the entry rate rather than the exit rate echo findings 
reported for the USA by Grogger (2004) and Haider and Klerman (2005).  
  To investigate the determinants of these trends, we propose a multivariate dynamic 
random effects probit model of individuals’ annual SA entry and exit probabilities and fit it to 
data from waves 1–15 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). Estimates of the 
model and simulated exit and entry rates derived from them are used to assess the 
determinants of the observed trends. The results highlight the importance of both the decline 
in the unemployment rate and other secular changes in the socioeconomic environment 
                                                 
1 The proportion receiving SA in year t, pt, is given by: pt  =  (1–xt) pt–1 + et (1–pt–1), where xt is the exit rate and 
et is the entry rate at t. 
  3including two reforms to the social security benefit system. The results also point to 
substantial individual heterogeneity in SA transition rates. 
  In the next section, we explain the nature of benefit system in Britain today, referring 
to both SA and in-work benefits, and the major changes that occurred over the period 1991–
2005. In subsequent sections, we introduce the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data 
used in the analysis, and then present the statistical model, estimates and results. 
  The focus throughout is on individuals of working age. More specifically, we consider 
only individuals below the age of 60. (The state retirement pension age in Britain is 60 for 
woman and 65 for men.) To avoid complications associated with education and training, we 
also exclude individuals aged less than 25, or individuals in families in which there are any 
adults of working age who are full-time students.  
  This paper is a substantially revised version of a longer report (Cappellari and Jenkins 
2008a) to which we refer readers for additional explanations and detail. For this paper, we 
have revised aspects of the specification of the dynamic random effects probit model, and 
present counterfactual simulations to analyze the various determinants of trends. 
 
 
BENEFITS AND TAX CREDITS IN BRITAIN 
 
Social assistance benefits are income-tested “safety net” cash benefits, sometimes called 
“welfare benefits”. They are paid to bring incomes up to some minimum income level – they 
refer to income maintenance. By contrast, social insurance benefits refer to income 
replacement – payments made in response to the occurrence of particular risky events such as 
sickness or unemployment and for which an appropriate record of social insurance 
contributions exists.
2 See the OECD Glossary of statistical terms used in the National 
Accounts at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2478.  
 
                                                 
2 There are also benefits for individuals who are ill or injured that are not discussed here: Statutory Sick Pay for 
employees, Employment and Support Allowance (replacing Incapacity Benefit since October 2008) for those 
unable to work because of illness or disability and with a suitable national insurance contributions record, 
Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit for those ill or disabled because of an accident or event that happened at 
work or in connection with work. For an overview of the current British system of cash benefits and tax credits 
for working and non-working families, see 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/MoneyTaxAndBenefits/BenefitsTaxCreditsAndOtherSupport/index.htm. For cross-
national comparisons of income maintenance systems, see Immerwoll (2009), Midgley (2008), and Walker 
(2005). 
  4The Current System of Benefits and Tax Credits 
The principal social assistance benefits in Britain for people of working age, according to 
these definitions, are those shown in Table 1. Income Support (IS) and income-based Job 
Seekers Allowance (JSA) differ from Housing Benefit (HB) and Council Tax Benefit (CTB) 
because receipt depends on employment status. Put differently, receipt of HB and CTB 
depends on income (and some other conditions), but not on employment or job-search status. 
As Figure 1 shows, the SA receipt rates according to both the narrower and broader 
definitions move in tandem over time. The populations receiving IS and JSA on the one hand, 
and HB and CTB on the other hand, overlap substantially, and so the choice of whether to 
include housing benefits in the definition of social assistance benefits is of little practical 
importance in the current context. In the analysis presented below, we do not include housing 
benefits (HB and CTB) in our definition of SA. 
<Table 1 near here> 
  Alongside these benefits for non-working families, there is extensive cash support 
available for low income working families, currently through the Working Tax Credit 
program. (It plays a similar role to the Earned Income Tax Credit in the USA.) The eligibility 
conditions relate to having an income below a specified minimum level, and at least one 
family member in “full-time work” defined to mean working at least 16 hours per week.  
 
Changes, 1991–2005 
Over the period under analysis, the system of benefits and tax credits in Britain changed 
substantially. The main reforms are summarized, by year of introduction, in Table 2. Prior to 
1996, a non-working family could be receiving Income Support (social assistance), 
Unemployment Benefit (UB, social insurance), or both. In October 1996, cash benefits for 
unemployed jobseekers were unified under the Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) program, with a 
distinction made between “income-based” JSA corresponding to the former Income Support 
and “contribution-based” JSA corresponding to the former UB, which was a flat-rate non-
means-tested social insurance benefit paid to unemployed individuals with a satisfactory 
National Insurance contribution record. JSA also incorporated more stringent job search 
requirements for those assessed as available for work. Unemployed individuals with an 
incomplete national insurance contribution record and a sufficiently low income were also 
eligible to claim contribution-based JSA on a means-tested basis. Because UB payments were 
relatively low, most recipients’ families were also eligible for IS, and it remains the case 
  5today that most JSA recipients receive income-based benefits.
3 Official statistics on JSA 
numbers no longer distinguish between contribution-based and income-based JSA, and it is 
also difficult to identify them separately in household surveys. For this reason, we include 
both types of JSA in our definition of SA: see below. 
<Table 2 near here> 
  The other main changes were introduced by the new Labour government that was 
elected in May 1997. The most significant reform was the replacement of the existing in-
work benefits program, Family Credit, by the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) program 
modeled more closely on the US EITC. Aiming to “make work pay”, WFTC had more 
generous payments and extended eligibility notably by lowering the number of work hours 
required for qualification. Take-up was substantial, as Figure 1 illustrates. In 2003, the child 
allowance elements of WFTC were spun out into the Child Tax Credit program, which aimed 
to unify child support payments across the income maintenance system more generally. The 
WFTC component supplementing earnings became Working Tax Credit, and eligibility was 
extended to single people and to families without children. This gave another fillip to the 
proportion of working-age adults receiving tax credits: see Figure 1. 
  Among other policy reforms introduced by the Labour government to make work pay 
was a national minimum wage rate per hour. And, as part of its aim to reduce child poverty, 
there was an increase in support for families with children through increases in Child Benefit 
(a universal non-income-tested benefit paid per child) and in the child allowance element of 
other benefits.
4  
  Brewer and Shephard’s (2004) summary assessment, focusing on families with 
dependent children, is that “[e]xamining outcomes of Labour’s ultimate objectives would 
lead one to conclude that the make work pay policies have been a success. … Academic 
studies agree that government policies were partially responsible for these changes, at least 
among lone parents.” (2004, p. vii.)
5  
                                                 
3 According to the latest administrative statistics, at 1 August 2004, there were 737,000 JSA recipients in total, 
of whom 18 percent (136,000) received only contribution-based JSA and 82 percent (601,000) received income-
based JSA, including 12,000 with underlying entitlement to contribution-based benefit. See 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd1/stats_summary/Stats_Summary_dec2004_final.pdf.  
4 There were also a number of active labor market programs for specific groups, the New Deals for unemployed 
young people and for lone parents, providing individualized help to improve job readiness and job search. 
Because of their targeted focus, and since they do not directly affect incomes, they are less relevant in the 
current context. 
5 For an overview of the impact of WFTC on labor supply and other outcomes, see the Economic Journal 
Features issue on ‘In-work benefit reform in a cross-national perspective’ (Brewer et al. 2009).Earlier research 
focusing on labor supply effects includes Blundell (2001), Blundell and Hoynes (2004), Brewer et al. (2006), 
Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007), and Gregg et al. (2009).  
  6  To the extent that policies making work pay are successful, we would expect them to 
be accompanied by corresponding reductions in SA receipt, and for the turning points and 
inflections in SA receipt trend lines to correspond with the major changes in tax credits (1999 
and 2003). Similarly, we would expect the tightening of job search requirements for 
unemployed people accompanying the introduction of JSA in 1996 to lead to a decline in SA 
receipt, other things equal. Analysis of administrative record data by Petrongolo (2007) of 
men aged 16–64 suggests that tighter job search requirements were successful in moving 
individuals off unemployment benefits. Manning (2009) derives the same conclusion using 




DATA: THE BRITISH HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEY 
 
We track SA receipt among working age adults using BHPS data from survey years 1991 to 
2005.
7 The first wave of the BHPS is a nationally representative probability sample of the 
private household population, with interviews in the Autumn of 1991. The achieved sample 
consists of more than 10,000 individuals in some 5000 households, who have been re-
interviewed annually. Individuals in split-off families are followed, as in other household 
panels such as the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics or the German Socio-Economic 
Panel. For full documentation of the BHPS, see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/survey/bhps. 
  We define an individual to be in receipt of SA if any individual in his or her family is 
receiving social assistance benefits at the time of the BHPS interview. In Britain, assessment 
of benefit eligibility is based on the income of the nuclear family, the so-called “benefit unit”, 
which is a single person or a couple living together with or without dependent children. (A 
dependent child is aged less than 16 years, or more than 16 years but under 19 years and 
unmarried, in full-time non-advanced education and living with his/her parents.) It is not 
legal marital status that distinguishes a “couple” from two single adults; it is living 
arrangements (cohabiting unions are treated like legal marriages). In the sample of SA 
recipients we analyze, only one quarter are lone parents, 54 percent live with a partner (37 
                                                 
6 At the same time, the reform did not increase the job-finding rate unambiguously, because some recipients 
moved instead to other benefits such as incapacity benefits (Manning 2009; Petrongolo 2007). 
7 We use respondents to the original (‘Essex’) sample only. Respondents from the extension samples for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland incorporated in the BHPS at the end of the 1990s are not used. Taking 
account of the differential sample inclusion probabilities would be a large task, beyond the scope of this project, 
and the number of observations in the original 1991 sample is relatively large in any case (see below). 
  7percent have a partner and children), and 21 percent are childless single adults.
8 We track 
individuals over time, not families, since families and households cannot be followed over 
time as a unit in any consistent manner. Families and households change their composition 
over time as individuals arrive (e.g. via partnership formation) or depart (e.g. via partnership 
dissolution). These types of change are common (Jenkins 2000). 
  We define SA to include IS and either UB or JSA (of either type). This is a matter of 
practical necessity: it is the only definition of SA that can be measured consistently over time 
using the BHPS (and most other surveys). As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to reliably 
distinguish between receipt of contribution-based JSA and income-based JSA. Indeed, since 
JSA’s introduction in 1996, the BHPS interview has not asked respondents receiving JSA to 
distinguish between the two types for precisely this reason. See Cappellari and Jenkins 
(2008a) for further discussion.  
  Our definition of SA receipt for a given year t refers to receipt at the time of the 
BHPS interview in survey year t (typically September or October) – this is the definition used 
for Figure 1. The entry rate refers to the proportion of individuals not receiving SA at the year 
t–1 interview that are receiving SA at the year t interview and the exit rate refers to the 
proportion of individuals receiving SA at the year t–1 interview that are not receiving SA at 
the year t interview. Thus, the dynamics of SA receipt analyzed in this paper refer to 
transitions to and from receipt between successive annual interviews. 
  An alternative approach to receipt dynamics is to take a spell-based approach, where 
spells are defined in terms of consecutive “benefit years” or, where data are available, 
consecutive sub-annual periods such as “months”.
9 For the USA, the benefit year approach 
has been applied in studies using PSID data from the pioneering analysis of AFDC benefit 
receipt by Bane and Ellwood (1983, 1994) onwards. The latter approach is commonly applied 
in studies based on the Survey of Income and Program Participation or administrative record 
data.  
  By focusing on transitions between annual interviews, we play to the BHPS’s 
strengths. Wishing to minimize measurement error and respondent burden, most BHPS effort 
is devoted to collecting information about the various income sources received at the time of 
the interview and the corresponding amounts. To be sure, at each interview the survey also 
asks about receipt of each of a large number of cash benefits for each month between the 
                                                 
8 We use the British term “lone parent” rather than “single mother” because the majority of lone parenthood 
spells in Britain arise from the ending of a partnership rather by a birth to a single-never-married woman. 
9 A “benefit year” refers to receipt at least once during that year. 
  8interview month and the September of the year prior to the current survey year using the 
respondent’s retrospective recall. There are, however, substantial complications arising in the 
creation of consistent monthly histories of SA receipt. Not only are there “seam” problems to 
deal with (an implausible number of transitions at the seam where successive histories 
overlap and have to be spliced together), but there are also issues arising from the family-
based measure of receipt since histories are required for all the individuals who were in each 
person’s family month by month. See Cappellari and Jenkins (2008a) for further discussion. 
Addressing these issues is a major and important task, but beyond the scope of this paper. We 
therefore remind readers that our analysis focuses on SA transitions between one year and the 
next, and not on spells of receipt.  
  With fifteen waves of BHPS data, our analysis data set contains a maximum of 15 
observations per individual on SA receipt and other variables. At least two consecutive waves 
of data are required to estimate transition rates and any multivariate model of dynamics. We 
track individuals from when they are first observed as BHPS respondents until the first wave 
at which they drop out of the panel, either completely non-responding or with item non-
response of sufficient degree that the individual’s data cannot be used for estimation. If 
individuals rejoin the panel at some later wave, leading to gaps in benefit receipt sequences, 
we exclude them because taking account of intermittent participation complicates modeling 
substantially. Thus, we focus on what is known as the ‘absorbing attrition’ case. The sample 
used for the empirical analysis is restricted to individuals of working age and not in full-time 
education (see earlier), and without missing data for some important explanatory variables. 
The basic estimation sample is an unbalanced panel of 75,988 person-wave observations for 
9,036 adults. The majority (56 percent) of the sequences start at wave 1, but there are 
sequences that begin at each subsequent wave as well (roughly 200–300 adults each year). 
See Cappellari and Jenkins (2008a) for further details concerning sample selection, and 




A DYNAMIC RANDOM EFFECTS PROBIT MODEL OF TRANSITION 
PROBABILITIES  
 
Our data consist of a temporally ordered sequence of ones (representing SA receipt at a 
particular interview) or zeros (representing non-receipt), for every adult included in the 
  9analysis sample. To analyze these data, we propose use of panel data methods for binary 
sequences, specifically a version of the dynamic random effects probit model popularized by 
Heckman (1981a) which also accounts for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Dynamic 
random effects probit models have been used to analyze social assistance dynamics in 
Sweden and Canada by Andrén (2007), Hansen and Lofstrom (2006), and Hansen et al. 
(2006). One US application is by Chay and Hyslop (2000). Our model differs from those 
cited because we allow the same set of covariates to affect exit and entry rates but with 
potential different impacts.
10 More generally, we know of no previous study that has used 
dynamic random effects probit models to analyze and simulate entry and exit rates in the way 
that we do.  
 
The Multivariate Statistical Model 
Let p*it represent the latent probability of SA receipt in each year of the sequence of Ti years 
for which an individual is observed in the analysis panel data, excluding the first year (t = 1), 
where  
p*it  =  γ′Zit–1  +  λ′Wit–1 yit–1  +  τi  +  ζit;   t = 2, …, Ti.  (1) 
Each individual, i = 1, …, N, is observed to receive SA (yit = 1) in year t if p*it > 0, and not to 
receive it (yit = 0) otherwise. Observed individual heterogeneity is measured by the vector of 
variables represented by Zit–1 and Wit–1 (each of which includes an intercept term). These 
variables are measured in the year at which the individual is at risk of making a transition 
(year t–1). As we show shortly, the interactions between the lagged dependent variable (yit–1) 
and each element of Wit–1 allow characteristics to affect entry and exit rates differently.  
  Unobserved heterogeneity is characterized by a fixed individual-specific component 
(τi) and a white noise error component (ζit), where the error terms are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with each other and with each element of Zit. The errors are each assumed to 
have a mean of zero and be normally distributed, with the variance of ζit normalized to be 
one, and variance of τi estimated from the data. In order to relax the assumption that the 
unobserved individual-specific components are uncorrelated with the observed explanatory 
variables, we follow Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984), and many researchers since, 
in allowing for correlations between ui and Zit by supposing that 
                                                 
10 Ribar’s (2005) endogenous switching model of AFDC transitions shares this feature, but models unobserved 
heterogeneity differently. On endogenous switching models of transitions, see also Cappellari and Jenkins 
(2004, 2008b). 
  10τi  =  ξ′ i Z  + ui  (2) 
where ui is distributed N(0, σu
2) and is assumed independent of Zit and ζit for all persons and 
time periods. The  i Z  may be defined in several ways – we follow the common practice of 
defining them as the longitudinal average for each individual of each characteristic within the 
vector Zit (with the exception of intrinsically time-varying variables like age). Intuitively, 
differences in longitudinally-averaged characteristics are informative about underlying 
individual-specific characteristics, so that the unobserved individual differences that are left 
(ui) may be more plausibly supposed to be independent of observed characteristics. For 
brevity in notation, we subsume the longitudinally-averaged variables into the vector Zit 
henceforth. 
  There is an issue for estimation concerning the ‘initial conditions’ of the sequence of 
observations for each individual – whether yi1 is independent of ui. If receipt in the initial year 
is correlated with the time-invariant individual-specific effect, a correlation is induced 
between the error term and the lagged dependent variable in (1), leading to bias in parameter 
estimates.  
  We handle initial conditions using the conditional maximum likelihood estimator 
proposed by Wooldridge (2005). Rather than modeling the joint distribution of the sequence 
of binary receipt indicators from the initial one to the final one conditioning on the set of 
explanatory variables, Wooldridge showed that one may model the distribution of the binary 
receipt indicators from ti = 2, …, Ti, conditioning on the set of explanatory variables and the 
binary receipt indicator for the initial year. Wooldridge proposed modeling the distribution of 
τi conditional on yi1 and either Zi = (Zi1, Zi2, …, ZiT), or  i Z . His model for the individual-
specific component (abstracting from  i Z  already incorporated using the Chamberlain-
Mundlak specification) can be written as:  
τi  =  a0  +  a1 yi1  +  ui + ζit,  (3) 
so that equation (1) becomes 
p*it  =  γ′Zit  +  λ′Wit–1 yit–1  + ξ′ i Z   + a0  +  a1 yi1  +  ui  +  ζit;   t = 2, …, Ti.  (4) 
The Wooldridge estimator has the advantages that initial conditions do not have to be 
modeled and estimation can done using standard random-effects probit software.
11  
                                                 
11 In our earlier work (Cappellari and Jenkins 2008a), we showed that the Wooldridge estimator provided almost 
identical parameter estimates to the estimators of Heckman (1981) and Orme (2001) that also account for the 
initial conditions issue, for both balanced and unbalanced panels. We attribute this robustness to the long length 
of our panel. See also Arkay (2009) and Arulampalam and Stewart (2009). We focused on estimates based on 
  11  The model outlined incorporates a relatively simple dynamic structure. It 
characterizes a first order Markov process: transition behavior does not depend on receipt 
history beyond the year before the current one. Higher order Markov models can be fitted as 
Chay and Hyslop (2001) and Stewart (2007) demonstrate, but we find that our model 
characterizes aggregate trends relatively well (see below). More flexible approaches to 
duration dependence can also be modeled using survival analysis methods applied to spell 
data. We eschew those methods because of the difficulties of deriving consistent monthly 
histories (see earlier), and because using the annual interview data to define spells would 
underestimate the prevalence of short spells. For spell length predictions from our first order 
Markov model ignoring the latter issue and employing a “steady state” assumption, see 
Cappellari and Jenkins (2008a). 
 
Model Implications for Entry and Exit Probabilities 
The dynamic random effects probit model characterizes transition probabilities for 
individuals of different types given appropriate conditioning on receipt status at t–1. The 
implied SA entry rate for non-recipients, eit, is:  
eit ≡  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 0, Zit–1, Wit–1)  =  Φ( (γ′Zit–1 )/(1–ρ)
0.5 ).  (5) 
The implied SA persistence rate for recipients, sit, is  
sit  ≡  Pr(yit = 1| yit–1 = 1, Zit–1, Wit–1) =  Φ( (γ′Zit–1  + λ′Wit–1)/(1–ρ)
0.5 )  (6) 
and the SA exit rate for recipients, xit, is 
xit  ≡  Pr(yit = 0| yit–1 = 1, Zit–1, Wit–1) =  1 – sit  (7) 
where ρ = σu
2/(1+σu
2). The impact on the entry rate of a factor depends on the factor’s 
coefficient in γ. For example, we would expect larger unemployment rates to be associated 
with a larger SA entry rate and a smaller exit rate (a larger persistence rate), other things 
being equal. In this case, the coefficient on the unemployment rate in γ (call it γunemp) would 
be positive. For exit rates, ascertaining associations is not quite as straightforward. A negative 
association between the exit rate and the unemployment rate requires γunemp + λunemp to be 
negative.  
  We simulate aggregate entry and exit rates for each year using (5) and (7) and our 
estimates of γ, λ and σu
2 to derive predicted probabilities of entry and exit for each individual 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Heckman estimator in our earlier work. Compared to the model specification employed then, the main 
differences in the current paper are measurement of observed characteristics at t–1 rather than t, and a more 
  12at risk of a transition that year, and then averaging the individual-specific probabilities across 
those at risk. Thus, the model characterizes of changes over time in aggregate entry and exit 
rates in terms of either changes over time in coefficients (including intercepts) when allowed 
to be time-varying, or changes over time in the distribution of characteristics among those at 
risk of exit or entry (such as an upgrading in educational qualifications). We assess the 
impact of specific factors on trends using counterfactual simulations corresponding to these 
two sources of change, asking what would have happened to entry and exit rates were a set of 
coefficients to have remained fixed at the value for a specific year, or were the distribution of 
a particular characteristic to have remained as in the distribution for a specific year. 
 
Explanatory variables 
Observed characteristics are summarized by sex and age, highest educational qualification, 
and health status. Age refers to whether the individual is aged 50 or more years: we expect 
older workers to have less work attachment, other things equal, and hence higher SA entry 
and lower SA exit rates. We distinguish four categories of educational qualification: none, 
low, high, and missing. “Low” refers to having passes in examinations taken at age 16 
(CSE(s) and/or O-levels); “high” refers to having passes in examinations taken at age 18 (A-
level(s)) or higher qualifications such as a degree. Around one tenth of respondents have 
missing data on educational qualifications: these are mostly respondents for whom only a 
proxy interview was gained but sufficient information was derived about other characteristics 
from the proxy respondent so that the individual could be included in the sample. The 
missing qualifications indicator is better interpreted as a control for response propensity than 
as a measure of educational qualifications. Health status refers to whether the respondent 
stated that s/he had one of more of 13 health problems.
12  
  The characteristics of each respondent’s family are summarized by the number of 
dependent children, whether the age of the youngest child is less than five years, and by 
family type (single adult, couple, or lone parent). We also control whether the respondent 
lives in the London area (as the labor market is very different from elsewhere in the country), 
and housing tenure (whether the respondent lived in owner-occupied housing rather than 
                                                                                                                                                        
extensive set of variables included in Wit–1.  
12 The problems refer to: (1) Problems or disability connected with: arms, legs, hands, feet, back, or neck 
(including arthritis and rheumatism); (2) Difficulty in seeing (other than needing glasses to read normal size 
print); (3) Difficulty in hearing; (4) Skin conditions/allergies; (5) Chest/breathing problems, asthma, bronchitis; 
(6) Heart/blood pressure or blood circulation problems; (7) Stomach/liver/kidneys; (8) Diabetes; (9) Anxiety, 
depression or bad nerves; (10) Alcohol or drug related problems; (11) Epilepsy; (12) Migraine or frequent 
headaches; (13) Other health problems.  
  13other tenures such as social housing or renting privately). We do not suggest that tenure itself 
necessarily has an impact; rather it is a marker for other factors including differences in 
wealth and assets and local area disadvantage. 
  The remainder of the explanatory variables relate to the factors cited earlier in the 
descriptions of trends in aggregate receipt and transition rates (Figures 1 and 2). We 
summarize time-varying labor market tightness in terms of the respondent’s local area 
unemployment rate. By local area, we mean travel-to-work area (TTWA).
13  
  The impacts of policy changes are monitored by allowing the intercept terms in Zit–1 
and Wit–1 to differ by survey year. We follow this strategy rather than including measures of 
(say) program generosity over time for two reasons. First, benefit rates in the UK are set 
nationally; there is no spatial variation across regions or states as in the USA or some 
European countries. Second, there have many program changes within the 1991–2005 period 
(Table 2), and so it is difficult to identify the impact of any specific policy reform. Our 
approach is therefore more descriptive than causal modeling: we expect that if the policies 
cited in Table 2 had an effect on SA entry and exit rates, they will be reflected in the time-
varying intercepts, notably around 1996, 1999 and 2003.
14  
 
Characteristics of At-Risk Groups, and Trends over Time 
Changes in the aggregate SA transition rates depend in part on changes in the composition of 
the populations at risk (see above). Consider first those at risk of entry (SA non-recipients). 
Averaging over the period as a whole, the mean age was 41 years, half the sample were 
women, and just over one half reported at least one health problem. About thirteen percent 
had no educational qualifications and a quarter had only low educational qualifications. 
Almost a half of non-recipients had at least one dependent child and just under a fifth had a 
child aged less than five years. Four-fifths were part of a couple, some 17 percent were single 
adults and 3 percent were lone parents. Just over 80 percent lived in owner-occupied 
accommodation, one in ten lived in the London area, and the average local area rate was just 
                                                 
13 More precisely, the local area unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of unemployed to the number in 
the labor force for the respondent’s TTWA at the time of the interview, derived from the Joint Unemployment & 
Vacancies Operating System Cohort (a 5 percent sample of all computerized claims for unemployment-related 
benefits selected by reference to a claimant’s National Insurance Number). TTWAs are defined with reference 
to commuting patterns, and correspond broadly to a city and surrounding area. See Cappellari and Jenkins 
(2008a) for more details of the construction of the series. 
14 We also considered a quasi-differences-in-differences approach in which we also included interactions 
between the survey year indicators in Zit–1 and Wit–1 and the presence of children: the reasoning is that the 
Labour government’s reforms were directly primarily at families with children. As it happened, very few 
interaction variable coefficients were statistically significant, and the temporal pattern of the estimates did not 
  14over 5 percent. These whole-period averages disguise some marked trends over time. In 
particular, there was a rise in the proportion reporting a health problem (up from around 50 
percent in 1991 to around 60 percent in 2005), and even larger changes in the distribution of 
educational qualifications. The fraction of non-recipients with no or low educational 
qualifications declined from around 53 percent in 1991 to 26 percent in 2005. The other main 
variation over time was in local area unemployment rates, which declined from almost 10 
percent on average at the start of the 1990s to just over 2 percent in 2005. In contrast, the 
means of virtually all the demographic variables (age, number and age of children, family 
type) changed very little. 
  These changes suggest that one reason for the decline in SA entry rates may be the 
improvement in educational qualifications (improving employability) and the decline in local 
area unemployment rates reflecting improved availability of jobs. The rate of decline in the 
average local area unemployment rate leveled off around 1997, which is consistent with the 
leveling off in the decline in the entry rate around that year (Figure 2). 
  Consider now those at risk of SA exit. Averaging over the period as a whole, we find 
that compared to non-recipients, the proportion of female recipients is larger (60 percent 
rather than 50 percent), and the proportion with relatively low educational qualifications is 
higher (40 percent of recipients have no qualifications compared to 13 percent of non-
recipients). A quarter of recipients belong to families with three or more children (compared 
to 8 percent of recipients) and the proportion with a child aged less than five years is 25 
percent rather than 18 percent. About one quarter of recipients are lone parents but only 3 
percent of non-recipients. The proportion of SA recipients living in owned accommodation is 
only one third compared with 80 percent for non-recipients. In addition, recipients tend to 
live in areas with slightly higher unemployment rates than non-recipients. In sum, SA receipt 
is concentrated among individuals with characteristics commonly associated with labor 
market disadvantage.  
  As far as trends are concerned, there are both similarities and differences between SA 
recipients and non-recipients. For both groups, the prevalence of health problems rose 
between 1991 and 2005, but the increase is larger for recipients (from 53 percent to 76 
percent, compared to from 50 percent to 59 percent). Local area unemployment rates fell for 
both groups; so too did the proportion with no educational qualifications but the decline in 
the latter was smaller for SA recipients than non-recipients. There are some distinctive 
                                                                                                                                                        
correspond with expectations regarding the timing of policy changes. 
  15demographic trends for recipients: the proportion with children, and with young children in 
particular, declined over time. There was also a decline in number of lone parents among 
recipients (from 35 percent in 1991 to 18 percent in 2005). In principle this might be 
explained by a shift in low income families with children (and lone parents in particular) 
from SA receipt to receipt of in-work benefits such as WFTC, but the proportions of couples 
with children and of lone parents was largely unchanged over the period. Another marked 
trend among recipients is the decline in the proportion living in owned accommodation, from 
41 percent in 1991 to 22 percent in 2005. Put another way, the association between SA 
receipt and living in rented accommodation (much of which is subsidized social housing) has 
increased.  
  These patterns suggest that two trends in particular may help account for the decline 
in the aggregate SA exit rate over time: the rise in proportion of recipients with health 
problems, and the large rise in the proportion living in non-owned accommodation. Both 
trends are consistent with a ‘creaming’ hypothesis – the most skilled and work-ready 
individuals left SA for a job, whereas the group left on SA increasingly consisted of 




MODEL ESTIMATES AND COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS 
 
Model Estimates 
Estimates of the dynamic random effects probit model specified in (4) are set out in Table 3. 
In the top half of the table, the first column of numbers refers to estimates of γ and the second 
column to estimates of λ. In the bottom half of the table are the estimates of the effects of the 
longitudinally-averaged variables on SA receipt propensities, the impact of being in SA 
receipt when initially observed, and the variance of the unobserved heterogeneity 
distribution.  
  Table 3 shows that SA entry probabilities are lower for women, individuals living 
with a partner, and without a child aged less than 5 years. There is a gradient in entry rates 
with educational qualifications – highest for those with no qualification and lower the higher 
the qualifications attained (and higher still for those with missing qualifications data). There 
  16is no statistically significant association between entry rates and age, the presence of health 
problems, number of children, home ownership, and residential location.  
<Table 3 near here> 
  The higher the local area unemployment rate, the higher the SA entry rate – which is 
consistent with the aggregate trend data shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
  The estimated coefficients on the survey year variables also correspond with the 
trends in aggregate data. (The year labels shown in Table 3 refer to year t for transitions 
between year t–1 and year t.) Between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, the coefficients 
become increasingly negative implying a lower SA entry rate, other things equal. These 
appear to be large changes: the coefficient doubled in magnitude between 1995 and 2005, 
from –0.14 to –0.28. But are there jumps in the coefficient estimates corresponding to years 
of major benefit reform – survey years 1997, 2000, and 2004 according to the labeling 
convention used in the table?  
  The estimates suggest that the introduction of JSA, accompanied by tightening of 
eligibility conditions, was associated with a decline in SA entry rates. For those at risk of 
entry in 1996 (year t = 1997), the estimated coefficient is –0.17, but it is –0.37 for those at 
risk of entry in 1997 (year t = 1998). There is also some evidence consistent with a WFTC 
introduction effect as the coefficient for those at risk of entry in 1999 (year t = 2000) is –0.24, 
but –0.43 for those at risk of entry a year later. In contrast, there is no similar change in the 
coefficients for years round the change from WFTC to WTC. 
  We therefore find a smoking gun for some effects of benefit policy reform on SA 
entry rates. We are cautious about drawing stronger causal conclusions for the reasons 
described earlier.  
  What about the determinants of exit rates? Observe, first of all, that relatively few 
coefficients on the variables included in the vector of interactions between characteristics and 
lagged SA receipt status are statistically significant. The exceptions concern the number of 
children in the family and whether the respondent has a partner. Having more children is 
associated with a larger exit rate, whereas being a member of a couple is associated with 
lower exit rate. Otherwise, we find, for example and as expected, that having better 
educational qualifications is associated with a higher exit rate, and a larger unemployment 
rate is associated with a lower exit rate.  
  By contrast with the results for entry rates, there appears to be little evidence of 
benefit policy reform effects on exit rates. For the relevant survey years, observe that the sum 
of corresponding γ and λ coefficients is close to zero: the coefficients are of approximately 
  17the same magnitude and of the opposite sign. Hence the change in the sums between 
successive years is also negligible. 
  The estimates of the parameters associated with unobserved heterogeneity are at the 
bottom of Table 3. The table shows that individuals with a disposition to health problems or 
many children are more likely to receive SA. Family type and housing tenure also matter. 
Individuals who are more likely to be lone parents are more likely to receive SA, whereas 
individuals with a partner are less likely to. Home-owners are less likely to receive SA than 
renters. Experiencing persistently high local area unemployment rates does not appear to be 
associated with a high probability of SA receipt, other things being equal. (It is the year-to-
year variations in unemployment that drive changes in SA receipt, by changing exit and entry 
propensities.) There is statistically significant unobserved heterogeneity in addition to the 
heterogeneity captured by the longitudinally-averaged variables: the estimate of σu
2 is 0.42. 
Finally, observe that initial conditions matter. Individuals who are receiving SA when 
initially observed are much more likely than non-recipients to be receiving SA in some 
subsequent year. 
 
Counterfactual Simulations to Assess the Drivers of Transition Rate Trends  
We now employ the model to assess the main drivers of the trends in aggregate annual SA 
entry and exit rates shown in Figure 2. Before embarking on the counterfactual simulations, 
we show first that the fitted model tracks the aggregate trends shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 
shows these “within-sample” entry and exit rate predictions by year, and also reproduces the 
aggregate series shown earlier. Chart (a) compares entry rates; chart (b) compares exit rates.  
  In two respects, the predictions are poor. First, within-sample predictions consistently 
over-estimate both entry and exit rates. We do not have an explanation for this but suspect 
that it relates to the use of non-linear functions in (5) and (7). (We have checked that it is not 
related to skewness in the distribution of predicted probabilities.) Second, the predicted trend 
between the first two years of each series is in the wrong direction. (Again we do not have an 
explanation for this.) But these are the only two years for which this is the case.  
  We would emphasize that otherwise the within-sample predictions track trends over 
time remarkably well. Turning points in both aggregate transition rate series correspond to 
turning points in both within-sample series.  
<Figure 3 near here> 
  18  Given this correspondence, we proceed to our counterfactual simulations. We 
consider the impact of four factors: falling unemployment rates, effects associated with the 
passage of time (which include any benefit policy reform effects), the secular improvement in 
educational qualifications, and changes in the distribution of housing tenure. 
  The first exercise concerns the impact of changing unemployment rates. To assess 
this, we consider what would have happened to SA entry and exit rates were unemployment 
remain at its 1993 peak, and everything else were to stay the same (including the values of 
the longitudinally-averaged variables and initial receipt status). Since the model is fitted to 
data on individual-specific local area unemployment rates, we first generate another set of 
within-sample estimates by replacing individual-specific local area unemployment rates 
within each year by the average rate among the relevant population at risk (there are different 
averages each year for SA recipients and non-recipients). This generates the transition rates 
series labeled “average unemployment rates” in Figure 4. This series is almost identical to the 
within-sample series shown in Figure 3. The counterfactual predictions are derived by 
replacing the average unemployment rates for each year with the average rates for 1993 in 
every year.  
<Figure 4 near here> 
  Figure 4 suggests that the fall in unemployment rates over the period had a large 
impact on SA entry rates. If unemployment had remained at its peak level, the entry rate 
would have been about 1 percentage point higher by 2005. This is a large impact given that 
the corresponding within-sample rate was 2 percent. Observe that most of impact of falling 
unemployment rates occurred before the turn of the 21
st century. (The decline in the rate 
leveled out around this time: see Figure 1.)  
  For SA exit rates, we see the impact expected: If unemployment rates had remained 
high, the exit rate would have been lower. However, the magnitude of the effect is small 
compared with the impact on the entry rate. The difference between the series is never more 
than 5 percentage points, which is small compared to an exit rate of between 40 percent and 
50 percent.  
  Our second counterfactual exercise concerns factors associated with the passage of 
time, which includes potential benefit policy reform effects. To do this, we compare our 
original within-sample prediction series with predicted transition rates generated by fixing the 
coefficients on the survey year indicators at the value of the estimated coefficient for 1993. 
(All other factors remain unchanged.) The series are shown in Figure 5. For entry rates, the 
effects associated with the passage of time are large, and of approximately the same order of 
  19magnitude as the effect of falling unemployment rates. We would emphasize that this 
exercise does not show the size of the impact of any specific benefit policy reform, rather it 
indicates the overall impact associated with the passage of time. (At most, it provides an 
upper bound on the cumulative impact of policy changes.) The multivariate model estimates 
shown in Table 3 suggest that there were other factors besides policy reforms that were 
operational throughout the period as a whole. The simulations for exit rates (chart b) confirm 
the impressions derived from discussion of the regression table estimates: there was little 
clear evidence of policy reform or other time effects in this case. The counterfactual and 
within-sample series overlap substantially. 
<Figure 5 near here> 
  The third counterfactual exercise was motivated by the marked upgrading in 
educational qualifications among the working-age population. Our simulations consider what 
would have happened to transition rates were the distribution of educational qualifications 
across the four categories (none, low, high and missing) to have remained as it was in 1991. 
In order to provide comparable within-sample predictions, we replaced actual educational 
qualifications in each year with the relevant sample proportion for that year (analogous to 
what we did for the unemployment simulation exercise). The results are summarized in 
Figure 6. For entry rates, we see an effect in the expected direction: without the secular 
upgrading, the SA entry rate would have been higher. However the magnitude of the effect is 
small relative to the effects of falling unemployment rates or “time”. For exit rates, there is 
what appears at first sight to be counter-intuitive result: exit rates are predicted to be higher 
when the distribution of educational qualifications is fixed at thee 1991 distribution. We 
resolve this puzzle by noting the particular nature of the upgrading of education qualifications 
among SA recipients. What is relevant for the simulations is not a the average of a single 
“education” variable, but a distribution across four educational qualification categories. As 
pointed out in the previous section, the fraction of SA recipients with no qualifications did 
not decline over time as fast as for non-recipients, and was higher in the first place. (By 2005, 
one third of SA recipients were in the no qualifications category but only 6 percent of non-
recipients.) So, we believe the simulation results shown in the figure reflect the deterioration 
over time in the distribution of qualifications of SA recipients relative to non-recipients. 
<Figure 6 near here> 
  In a fourth counterfactual exercise, we consider the impact of changing home 
ownership patterns over time, noting in particular the drop over the 1991–2005 period in the 
proportion of SA recipients who are owner-occupiers from around 40 percent to around 20 
  20percent. (Among non-recipients, the corresponding fraction remained relatively constant at 
just over 80 percent.) We considered what entry and exit rates would have been were the 
proportions of owner-occupiers among SA recipients and non-recipients had remained at 
their 1991 levels. As it happens, there was no impact at all on either entry rates or exit rates. 
The within-sample and counterfactual series coincided in both cases (charts not shown for 
brevity).  
 
Heterogeneity in Transition Rates 
Finally, we embark on a different type of simulation exercise. So far, the simulations have 
been concerned with generating predictions of aggregate transition rates and their trends over 
time. This involved averaging of individual-level predictions and hence information about the 
degree of heterogeneity in transition rates across individuals with different characteristics was 
hidden. We now illustrate this heterogeneity by predicting SA entry and exit rates for an 
individual with a specific “base” set of characteristics, and compare these predictions with 
derived by changing each of a number of characteristics one at a time. The predictions refer 
to a particular year. The results are shown in Table 4. The “base” set of characteristics refer 
to a woman aged 40 years, who is an owner-occupier living outside London, who is married 
with one child under 5, who has no health problems and no educational qualifications, and 
the local are unemployment rate is 3 percent, and the year is = 2005. She did not receive SA 
in the year she was initially observed. 
  The predicted entry probability for this person is 1.2 percent, and the predicted exit 
probability is 85.4 percent. If, instead, the person received SA when initially observed, then 
the entry probability is a massive five times larger, and the exit probability one quarter lower 
(row 2). Men and women have much the same entry and exit probabilities (row 3). More 
important than gender is family type. If the reference woman is a lone mother rather than 
married., then her entry probability more than trebles to 3.9 percent, and her exit probability 
falls by about a quarter to 68.6 percent (row 7). If in addition the woman is not an owner-
occupier, the entry probability is a massive 14.6 percent and the exit probability is half that of 
the base case, 41.6 percent (row 8). Differences in housing tenure alone are associated with 
large differences in transition probabilities (row 7). Not having children almost halves the 
entry probability, and slightly increases the exit probability (row 9). Finally, observe that if 
the year is changed from 2005 to 1993 and the local area unemployment rate from 3 percent 
to 9 percent, then the entry probability more than doubles (from 1.2 percent to 3.3 percent) 
  21and the exit probability hardly changes. This underlines our earlier remarks regarding the 
importance of changes in entry rates 
<Table 4 near here> 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have analyzed the dynamics of SA receipt among working-age adults in Britain between 
1991 and 2005, making the case that the near-halving in the aggregate annual receipt rate 
over this period was driven by a decline in the annual entry rate rather than changes in the 
annual exit rate (which actually declined). To examine the determinants of trends in 
aggregate SA transition rates, we have developed an innovative dynamic random effects 
probit model of SA receipt entry and exit probabilities, fitted it to BHPS data, and used the 
estimates to provide counterfactual simulations of trends in SA transition rates.  
Our analysis indicates that two sets of factors were the major determinants of 
transition rate trends and the counterfactual simulation exercises suggest that they had 
approximately equal-sized effects. First, there is the increasing health of the labor market, 
which we documented in terms of the fall in unemployment rates that occurred between 1993 
and the mid-2000s. If the current recession leads to a rise in unemployment rates that reverses 
the earlier decline, our results suggest that SA receipt rates will rise substantially.  
Second, there were a number of other changes between 1991 and 2005 in the 
socioeconomic environment including, in particular, various reforms to the income 
maintenance system in the 1990s. Our results suggest that two reforms had an effect on SA 
entry rates: the introduction of JSA in 1996 (by making it harder to claim), and the 
introduction of WFTC in 1999 (making work pay and hence SA less attractive). Investigating 
the extent to which these effects on SA receipt are genuinely causal is a task for future 
research; so too is analysis of the nature of other changes in the socioeconomic environment 
that were associated with the fall in the SA entry rate.  
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  25Table 1. The principal social assistance benefits in the UK today for working age adults 
 
Benefit Eligibility  conditions  (main) 
Income Support  Income less than a specified minimum level, and unavailable 
for full-time work (e.g. lone parent, registered sick or disabled, 
caring for someone who’s sick or elderly).  
Job Seekers Allowance 
(income based) 
Income less than a specified minimum level, and unemployed 
but able to work and available to work (which has to be 
regularly declared). 
Housing Benefit   Income less than a specified minimum level, and needing 
financial help to pay all or part of one’s housing costs. 
Council Tax Benefit  Income less than a specified minimum level, and needing 
financial help to pay all or part of one’s Council Tax bill. 
Notes: Income Support was introduced in 1988 (its predecessor was called Supplementary Benefit). Housing 
Benefit was introduced in 1983 and Council Tax Benefit in 1993. Job Seekers Allowance was introduced in 












1996  Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) introduced in October 1996 with “income 
based” and “contribution based” components. JSA replaced Income Support 
(IS) and Unemployment Benefit (UB) for unemployed jobseekers. 
Accompanied by more stringent job search requirements for those assessed as 
available for work. IS became available only to those not available for work. 
1999  Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) introduced in October 1999, and fully 
phased in by April 2000. This in-work benefit program for low income 
families was more generous and widened eligibility relative to its predecessor, 
the Family Credit program (FC). FC, introduced in 1988, replaced Family 
Income Supplement (FIS) which began in 1971. Administered by the income 
tax authorities (HM Revenue and Customs) rather then the benefits authorities 
(Department for Work and Pensions, and Benefits Agency). 
1999  Increased support for families with children, including increases in Child 
Benefit (flat-rate payment per child, paid regardless of parental work status or 
income), and increases in the child allowances in other benefits. 
1999 National  Minimum  Wage  introduced. 
2003  WFTC replaced by the Working Tax Credit (WTC) and Child Tax Credit 
(CTC) programs from April 2003. WTC extended eligibility to single people 
and to families without children. CTC unified child allowances across benefits. 
Note. See Brewer and Shephard (2004) for a concise overview of the Labour government’s welfare to work 
policies and associated changes in the benefit system. 
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Table 3. The probability of SA receipt (dynamic random effect probit model estimates) 
        
Explanatory variables (measured at t–1)  γ    λ   
Female –0.0895  ***  0.0896   
 (0.034)    (0.060)   
Aged 50 years or more  0.0529    0.0463   
 (0.044)    (0.081)   
Has health problem(s)  0.0278    –0.0143   
 (0.038)    (0.057)   
Educational qualifications         
  Low: O-level(s), CSE, etc  –0.2073  ***  –0.0534   
 (0.046)    (0.071)   
  High: A-level(s) or higher  –0.3623  ***  –0.0680   
 (0.045)    (0.073)   
 Missing  data  –0.4215  ***  0.0318  
 (0.063)    (0.150)   
Number of children in family  –0.0264    0.0751  *** 
 (0.024)    (0.027)   
Age of youngest child < 5 years  0.1540  ***  –0.1084   
 (0.049)    (0.073)   
Family type: lone parent  –0.0030    0.0724   
 (0.095)    (0.110)   
Family type: couple  –0.1214  *  –0.2342  *** 
 (0.069)    (0.079)   
House tenure: owned  –0.0491    0.0145   
 (0.056)    (0.059)   
Lives in London (inner or outer)  0.2402    0.0472   
 (0.163)    (0.091)   
Unemployment rate in local area (%)  0.0323  ***  –0.0107   
 (0.010)    (0.015)   
Survey year (year t)        
 1993  –0.0321    0.0049  
 (0.058)    (0.118)   
 1994  –0.0964    –0.0659   
 (0.060)    (0.121)   
 1995  –0.1372  **   0.0462  
 (0.060)    (0.122)   
 1996  –0.1559  **   0.0013  
 (0.061)    (0.124)   
 1997  –0.1734  ***  0.1401  
 (0.067)    (0.135)   
 1998  –0.2914  ***  0.2572  * 
 (0.077)    (0.147)   
 1999  –0.3655  ***  0.3811  **  (0.082)    (0.154)   
 2000  –0.2357  ***  0.2633  * 
 (0.080)    (0.157)   
 2001  –0.4262  ***  0.4703  *** 
 (0.089)    (0.165)   
 2002  –0.3834  ***  0.3103  * 
 (0.089)    (0.167)   
 2003  –0.3152  ***  0.5179  *** 
 (0.088)    (0.176)   
 2004  –0.3991  ***  0.2557  
 (0.092)    (0.173)   
 2005  –0.2847  ***  0.4109  ** 
 (0.090)    (0.181)   
Intercept –1.5693  ***  1.2370  *** 
 (0.102)    (0.180)   
Longitudinally-averaged variables         
  Has health problems    0.2495  ***    
 (0.055)      
  Family type: couple  –0.1473  *    
 (0.081)      
  Family type: lone parent  0.6074  ***    
 (0.121)      
  Number of children in family  0.0964  ***    
 (0.031)      
  Age of youngest child < 5 years  –0.0054      
 (0.085)      
  House tenure: owned  –0.7970  ***    
 (0.068)      
  Lives in London (inner or outer)  –0.2498      
 (0.171)      
 Unemployment  rate  in local area (%)  0.0118      
 (0.009)      
Received SA at t = 1  0.7658  ***    
 (0.051)      
σu
2 0.4201  ***    
 (0.036)      
Notes. Table shows authors’ estimates of equation (4) model fitted to data from waves 1–15 of the BHPS using 
the Wooldridge (2005) estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Log-
likelihood = –8792.293. Number of person-year observations = 66,952. Number of persons = 9,036. Reference 
categories: male, aged 25–50, has no health problems, has no educational qualifications, family type is single, 
lives in non-owned accommodation outside the London area, and the survey year is 1992. The outcome is 
measured in year t, and explanatory variables in year t–1, with the exception of the survey year indicators for 
which the indicator label refers to year t. 
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Table 4. Heterogeneity in SA annual entry and exit rates: predicted transition probabilities 
for different types of person 
 




    
1.  Base set of characteristics*    1.2  85.4 
As Base, except:     
2.  SA receipt in initial year    5.2  65.9 
3.  Man    1.4  85.4 
4.  Has health problems    2.1  79.7 
5.  Has educational qualifications to A-level or higher    0.5  91.3 
6.  Non-owner    5.9  63.9 
7.  Lone mother    3.9  68.6 
8.  Lone mother and non-owner  14.6  41.6 
9.  No children     0.7  88.7 
10. Year is 1993, local area unemployment rate = 9%    3.3  84.5 
Notes. Predictions derived by authors using equations (5) and (7). * Base characteristics: woman, 40 years old,  
living outside London, one child under 5, married , no health problems, no educational qualifications, local area 
unemployment rate  = 3%, owner-occupier, year = 2005, not receiving SA in year initially observed.  
 Figure 1. Proportion of working-age adults receiving social assistance benefits and tax 
















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Social assistance Social assistance including housing benefits
Tax credits Unemployment rate
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using data from waves 1–15 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), except 
for the unemployment rate which is series YBTI from the UK Office for National Statistics, 
http://www.ons.gov.uk. The unemployment rate is the ILO unemployment rate for all adults (men aged 16–64, 
women aged 16–59), derived from the Labour Force Survey, and is a three-month average centered on the 
October of the year in question. The definitions of social assistance, housing benefits, and tax credits are 
explained later. 
 
  30Figure 2. Annual rates of entry to and exit from social assistance benefit receipt: working-


































1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Exit rate Entry rate
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations using BHPS data. The definition of social assistance benefit receipt is explained 
later. 
 
  31Figure 3. Within-sample predictions of SA transition rates compared to aggregate transition 
rates 

















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Entry rate Entry rate, within-sample prediction
 
 


















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Exit rate Exit rate, within-sample prediction
 
Note. Authors’ calculations from BHPS data using the parameter estimates shown in Table 3. The construction 
of the within-sample series is explained in the text. The aggregate entry and exit rates series are the same as 
those shown in Figure 2. 
  32Figure 4. Counterfactual simulations of SA transition rates: what if local area unemployment 
rates were fixed at the 1993 average value? 
 

















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Entry rate, average unemployment rates Entry rate, 1993 unemployment rate
 


















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Exit rate, average unemployment rates Exit rate, 1993 unemployment rate
 
Note. Authors’ calculations from BHPS data using parameter estimates shown in Table 3. The construction of 
the reference and counterfactual series is explained in the text. 
  33Figure 5. Counterfactual simulations of SA transition rates: what if the survey year 
coefficients were all fixed at the value of the coefficients for 1993? 
 

















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Entry rate, within-sample prediction Entry rate, year fixed at 1993
 


















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Exit rate, within-sample prediction Exit rate, year fixed at 1993
 
Note. Authors’ calculations from BHPS data using parameter estimates shown in Table 3. The construction of 
the reference and counterfactual series is explained in the text. 
 
  34Figure 6. Counterfactual simulations of SA transition rates: what if the distribution of 
educational qualifications were to remain fixed at the 1991 distribution? 
 

















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Entry rate, average educ. quals. Entry rate, 1991 average educ. quals.
 


















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Exit rate, average educ. quals. Exit rate, 1991 average educ. quals.
 
Note. Authors’ calculations from BHPS data using parameter estimates shown in Table 3. The construction of 
the reference and counterfactual series is explained in the text. 
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